Products Liability—Washington Refuses to Allow Comparative Negligence to Reduce the Strict Liability Award—Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wn. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980) by Skinner, Shannon J.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 56 Number 2 
3-1-1981 
Products Liability—Washington Refuses to Allow Comparative 
Negligence to Reduce the Strict Liability Award—Seay v. Chrysler 
Corp., 93 Wn. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980) 
Shannon J. Skinner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Legal Remedies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shannon J. Skinner, Recent Developments, Products Liability—Washington Refuses to Allow Comparative 
Negligence to Reduce the Strict Liability Award—Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wn. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 
(1980), 56 Wash. L. Rev. 307 (1981). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol56/iss2/23 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-WASHINGTON REFUSES TO ALLOW COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE TO REDUCE A STRICT LIABILITY AWARD--Seay v.
Chrysler Corp., 93 Wn. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Elwood Seay was injured while backing a truck chassis manu-
factured by defendant Chrysler Corporation onto a trailer for transporta-
tion. As the plaintiff depressed the accelerator pedal slightly, the throttle
opened suddenly and he was thrown onto the trailer. The accelerator had
been temporarily attached to facilitate transportation. In an action
premised upon strict products liability, Seay sued for damages.
The jury found that the sudden acceleration was caused by defective
attachment during manufacture by Chrysler. Although the jury found
Chrysler liable, it also found that Seay's own negligence caused forty
percent of his injuries.I Using Washington's comparative negligence stat-
ute 2 as authority, the trial court reduced Seay's damages by forty percent.
Seay appealed. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
for plaintiff but reversed the reduction of the award. 3
In reversing the reduction of plaintiff's damage award, the majority
refused to join those states which have merged the concepts of strict prod-
ucts liability and comparative fault. Under this merger, strict liability is
used to determine the fact of the defendant's liability. If the plaintiff's
actions contributed to the injuries, comparative negligence is then applied
to reduce the monetary award.
Chief Justice Utter dissented, urging that the merger be judicially
adopted. Merger could also, however, be accomplished by legislative ac-
tion and is included as part of Washington's proposed products liability
bill. 4 This note will begin by examining the legal theories involved in
merging the concepts of comparative negligence and strict products liabil-
ity. The social policies that are behind the merger will then be discussed.
The note concludes with a review of the proposal now before the Wash-
ington legislature which would effect the merger and change the result in
Seay.
1. Seay was found to be negligent for backing the chassis onto the lower level of the trailer
without raising the upper level; consequently, he left too small a space for loading.
2. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.010 (1979). This section states:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representa-
tive to recover damages caused by negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or prop-
erty, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the percentage of negligence
attributable to the party recovering.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. The decision was six to three with Justice Dolliver writing for the majority.
4. State of Washington, S.B. 3158,47th Sess. (1981).
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II. BACKGROUND
Before comparative negligence emerged as a damage-reducing theory, 5
only two defenses were available to defendants in strict products liability
actions: assumption of risk and unforeseeable product misuse. 6 Both were
a complete bar to recovery by the plaintiff. Contributory negligence by
the plaintiff that consisted of failure to discover a defect was generally not
allowed as a defense. Courts thought that a failure-to-discover defense
would defeat the basic purpose of strict liability, which was to shift to
manufacturers the burden of risk of injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts.
7
As comparative negligence principles evolved, a debate arose over
whether a plaintiff's negligent actions should reduce the damages
awarded in a strict products liability action. Two views emerged. A ma-
jority of the jurisdictions that considered the question 8 decided in favor of
5. Contributory negligence operated as a liability-defeating theory before comparative negli-
gence was accepted. Seven jurisdictions adopted general comparative negligence statutes before
1965. The real spate of activity, however, came in 1969 to 1973, when nineteen more states adopted
it in some form, either judicially or by statute. Comparative negligence is now found in 34 states and
the Virgin Islands. For an excellent history of comparative negligence, see V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE 1-29 (1974).
6. The widely adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965) provides:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in
a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unrea-
sonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section ....
But cf. Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wn. 2d 86, 96, 515 P.2d 821, 826 (1973) (assumption of
risk not separate defense from contributory negligence).
Comment h of the Restatement provides:
"A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the
injury results from abnormal handling ... the seller is not liable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment h (1965). See Jackson v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Wn. App. 83, 100-01, 505 P.2d
139, 149 (1972), in which the court stated that misuse is an affirmative defense. Note, however, that
unforeseeable misuse is not accurately a defense, but rather a part of plaintiff's burden of proof.
Unforeseeable misuse breaks the causal chain so that plaintiff's injuries are not due to a defect. See
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 144 (1979); Twerski, The
Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MER-
CER L. REV. 403 (1978).
Courts generally, however, call misuse a defense. The result is the same for comparative purposes,
provided the injury was not due totally to the plaintiff's misuse, in which case no defect existed. Note
that the seller does have an obligation to prevent foreseeable misuse. See Noel, Defective Products:
Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 97 (1972).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965); 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[5][g] [v] (1980) (discussion in comparative negligence setting).
8. Nineteen jurisdictions have considered the problem. Sixteen have allowed the merger of com-
parative negligence with strict liability. They are: Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1979) (applying Virgin Islands law); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1975) (applying Mississippi law); Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D.
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applying comparative negligence in strict products liability actions. 9 A
minority' o decided that strict products liability and comparative negli-
gence are inherently incompatible.
The Washington Supreme Court previously discussed this incompati-
bility in Albrecht v. Groat, "1 a case involving the strict liability of com-
mon carriers. Stating that the carrier's liability was based on causation,
not negligence, the court found the comparative negligence statute inap-
plicable. The reasoning in Albrecht is in direct conflict with decisions of
other courts which have merged strict liability and comparative negli-
gence on the basis that comparative negligence is synonymous with com-
parative causation. 12
The court also refused to merge comparative negligence and strict lia-
bility in a contribution setting in Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Association
Kan. 1978); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. AVCO-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch Contstr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn.
1977) (aff'd by statute: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (Supp. 1980)); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,
406 A.2d 140 (1979); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979); General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Turner v. General
Motors Corp., 8 S.W.2d 844 (1979); and three jurisdictions which made the merger by statute: 1979
Conn. Pub. Acts No. 79-483; MICH. STAT. ANN. & 27A (Supp. 1980); NEB. REv. STAT. & 25-1151
(1979). Without purporting to apply Washington law, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting in
Washington also allowed the merger. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co.,
565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1979).
In addition, a majority of commentators have advocated the merger. Brewster, Comparative Negli-
gence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AiR. L. & CoM. 107 (1976); Epstein, Products Liability: De-
fenses Based on Plaintiffs Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 267; Feinberg, The Applicability of a Com-
parative Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts 2D (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. CouNsEL J. 39 (1975); Wade, Products
Liability and Plaintiffs Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373
(1973).
9. The problem for most states was that the comparative negligence statute of the state was lim-
ited to negligence actions, making a judicial extension of the statute necessary. See, e.g., Murray v.
Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 157 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law). In three states, the
problem was solved by a new statute. In addition, seven states have statutes not limited to negligence
actions. Of these, only one has considered the merger question, deciding it affirmatively. Edwards v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi law).
10. In addition to Washington, Colorado and Oklahoma follow the minority view. Kinard v.
Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d
1353 (Okla. 1974).
Commentators advocating this view are: Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-
Rethinking Some Products Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297 (1977); Levine, Strict Prod-
ucts Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 337, 355-56 (1977); Postilion, Strict Liability and Contributory Negligence: The Two Just
Don'tMix, 57 ILL. B. J. 26, 26-29 (1968).
11. 91 Wn. 2d 257,588 P.2d 229(1978).
12. Many courts have stated that the terms are synonymous because what is actually at issue in
both strict products liability and comparative negligence is each party's causal contribution to the
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v. Krack Corp. 13 In Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 14 a products liability
case, however, the court designated assumption of risk as a damage-re-
ducing factor, apparently allowing a comparison of the plaintiff's and de-
fendant's conduct. The theoretical breakthrough hinted at in Teagle, that
of allowing all of a plaintiff's negligent actions to reduce the damage
award, failed to materialize in Seay.
III. SUMMARY OF DECISION
In Seay, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the view which sup-
ports reduction of damages for contributory negligence. The majority be-
gan by noting that Washington's comparative negligence statute applies
only to actions based on negligence; in this case, defendant's liability was
premised upon the theory of strict products liability. The court stated that
strict liability actions in Washington are based on a no-fault concept, 15
whereas comparative negligence is based on fault. Consequently, the
injuries. Concluding that negligence is not really compared, these courts have generally retermed the
comparative process "comparative causation" or "comparative fault." They go on to note that the
latter term is more commonly accepted but less accurate in that fault alone without causation does not
subject one to liability. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
Virgin Islands law); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129,
1139 (9th Cir. 1977). See Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 752 (D. Kan.
1978); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. AVCO-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 n.5 (D. Idaho
1976); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 82 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 145-46 (1979); Seay
v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wn. 2d at 328, 609 P.2d at 1387 (1980) (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). But see
Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1975) (comparison of contribution to
accident, not injuries).
This note will use comparative causation for the sake of analytical accuracy. The author agrees that
causation is the best subject for comparison, even though this may lead to situations in which the
defendant was grossly negligent but not a major cause of the injury, thus liable for only a small part.
The use of causation as a basis for comparison has been criticized. Carestia, The Interaction of Com-
parative Negligence and Strict Products Liability-Where Are We?, 47 INS. CouNsEL J. 53, 67-70
(1980).
The use of causation, however, has the desirable effect of making a party liable only for the
amount he harmed another and of not introducing the character of the parties' conduct into the com-
parative process when such a factor is irrelevant as to the strictly liable defendant. This view is in
conflict with the Washington comparative negligence statute, which states that a plaintiff's damages
shall be reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff. WASH. REV. CODE §
4.22.010 (1979). Thus, juries now apparently are to compare only the conduct of the parties, not the
causal contribution. See Washington Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil, 6 WASHINGTON PRACTICE §
11.01 (2d ed. 1980). The court in Seay, however, phrased the jury's finding in terms of causation.
See note 29 infra. Statutes similar to Washington's, however, are found in states of the courts in the
majority.
13. 89 Wn. 2d 847,853,576 P.2d 388,391 (1978).
14. 89 Wn. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977) (involving an exploded flowrater, a device for measur-
ing chemical fertilizers).
15. The Seay court based this premise on Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89
Wn. 2d 847, 853, 576 P.2d 388, 391 (1978).
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court held that comparative negligence could not reduce a strict liability
award.
The court further based its refusal to reduce damages on the ground that
comparative negligence was a legislatively created doctrine, and there-
fore the extension should be legislative. Because the legislature had not
amended the comparative negligence statute after the court refused to
merge strict liability with comparative negligence in Albrecht, the court
concluded the legislature was satisfied with that decision. 16
Chief Justice Utter in dissent noted that the majority of jurisdictions
which have considered the question have allowed comparative fault prin-
ciples to reduce a strict products liability award. He agreed that the mer-
ger was intellectually untidy, but argued that the result was far more equi-
table because each party would bear the cost of its contribution to the
injuries. Furthermore, the merger would in some circumstances eliminate
the use of assumption of risk or unforeseeable product misuse as a com-
plete bar to plaintiffs' recovery. Liability could still be established with-
out proving that the defendant was negligent. Thus, the proof problems




The major basis for the court's decision in Seay was the "theoretical
difficulties of comparing concepts of fault (negligence) with no-fault
(strict liability) ... .",17 The former focuses "on the conduct of the indi-
vidual, [while] the latter focuses on the nature of the product and the con-
sumer's reasonable expectation with regard to that product."1 8 Only two
other courts, 19 however, have had difficulty comparing these theoretical
"apples and oranges." 20 The majority of courts found the difficulty to be
more apparent than real. 21
Courts adhering to the majority view reasoned that strict liability and
negligence are both based on principles of causative fault. 22 Fault, how-
16. Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wn. 2d at 323, 609 P.2d at 1384.
17. Id. at 322, 609 P.2d at 1384.
18. Id.
19. See note 10supra.
20. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380,385(1978).
21. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska
1976).
22. See discussion in note 12 supra.
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ever, need not have been the result of negligence. 23 As one author wrote:
In the case of products liability, the fault inheres primarily in the nature
of the product. The product is "bad" because it is not duly safe .... [Ilt is
not necessary to prove negligence in letting the thing get in the dangerous
condition .... Instead, simply maintaining the bad condition or placing the
bad product on the market is enough for liability . . . . This is legal fault,
and it can be mixed with, and compared with, fault of the morally reprehen-
sible type. One does not have to stigmatize conduct as negligent in order to
characterize it as fault.24
Once it is accepted that strict liability is not a no-fault concept25 a basis
for merger with comparative negligence exists. Many courts have re-
termed comparative negligence "comparative causation" or "compara-
tive fault." 26 If the plaintiff "caused" some portion of the injury, appli-
cation of comparative principles would reduce the award by the amount
of the plaintiff's contribution. Under a merger approach, the contribution
of both parties in causing the injuries would be compared; their negli-
gence would not be. 27
Policy reasons support a change to comparative causation in strict
products liability actions. Comparative causation would not add proof
problems to the plaintiff's burden. With a merger of strict liability and
comparative negligence, the defendant would remain liable for placing a
defective product on the market that was a cause of at least part of the
plaintiff's injuries. This is important because a major reason for strict
products liability was to relieve the plaintiff's burden of proving the man-
ufacturer was negligent. 28
Chief Justice Utter noted in his Seay dissent that the jury had no trouble
with the conceptual difficulties bothering the majority when it determined
23. An alternative to deciding that strict liability and comparative negligence are both based on
causation is to hold that strict liability is just a form of negligence per se, and is thus readily compara-
ble with a plaintiff's negligence. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967)
(first court to allow the merger). This alternative is usually rejected. See, e.g., Wenatchee Wenoka
Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wn. 2d 847, 853-54, 576 P.2d 388, 391 (1978).
24. Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff s Fault-the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29
MERCER L. REv. 373, 377 (1978) (footnotes omitted). The same idea is expressed in W. PROSSER.
THE LAW OF TORTS § 75 at 493 (4th ed. 1971).
25. See, e.g., Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 753 (D. Kan. 1978),
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843, 845-46 (1978).
26. See note 12 supra.
27. Triers of fact in Washington now apparently compare negligence, not causation. See note 12
supra.
28. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 44 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978); Seay v.




the portion of damages caused by the plaintiffs negligent actions. 29 He
also noted that federal courts have been making a similar comparison for
years in admiralty suits.30
A merger of the doctrines of comparative causation and strict products
liability would also yield more equitable results. Strict products liability
was adopted to aid injured persons in recovery 31 by shifting the burden of
the loss to the product sellers who were most able to allocate that loss
among product purchasers. 32 It is inequitable, however, for the consum-
ing public to pay for the passed-on costs that result from a plaintiffs own
negligence. 33 While passing on these costs may have been justified when
contributory negligence would have operated as a total bar to the plain-
tiff's recovery, it is not justified under a comparative system where an
"all or nothing" choice is no longer necessary. 34 Furthermore, with com-
parative causation, certain other types of plaintiff's behavior, now com-
plete bars to recovery, would in some circumstances be treated as dam-
age-reducing factors. 35
29. 93 Wn. 2d at 326, 609 P.2d at 1386. The majority did phrase the jury's findings in terms of
causation. It stated that the jury "found that 40 percent of [Seay's] damages could be attributed to his
own negligence." Id. at 321, 609 P.2d at 1383.
Other courts have made Chief Justice Utter's observation about jury ability. See Butaud v. Subur-
ban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
20 Cal. 3d 725, 738,575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (1978).
30. 93 Wn.2d at 326, 609 P.2d at 1385-86 (citing Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Hawn, 346 U'.S. 406,
408-09 (1953)).
31. "[W]e sought to place the burden of loss on manufacturers rather than'.. . injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves ....... Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
736, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63,377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,701 (1962) (emphasis in original).
32. Spellmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser, 14 Wn. App. 642, 646, 544 P.2d 107, 109 (1975); Murray v.
Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law).
33. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law).
See Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 751 (D. Kan. 1978).
34. "Such 'all-or-nothing' defenses are inequitable in their operation because they fail to dis-
tribute responsibility in proportion to fault and place upon one party the entire burden of a loss for
which the two are, by hypothesis, responsible." Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. &
Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139 (9th Cir. 1977). See Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149,
161 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods,
Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976). See also Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 735,
575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 147 (1979). In addition, see Chief Justice Utter's dissent in Seay,
wherein he states: "[F]aimess requires us to apportion liability so that the entire burden of loss is not
placed upon only one party when two are responsible." 93 Wn. 2d at 326, 609 P.2d at 1386.
35. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has already held that voluntarily and unreason-
ably encountering a known risk is a damage-reducing factor. Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wn.
2d 149, 157-58, 570 P.2d 438, 443 (1977) (citing some of the same cases often used to support
damage reduction where the plaintiff has been contributorily negligent). The Washington Court of
Appeals relied on Teagle to hold assumption of risk was damage-reducing. Berry v. Coleman Sys-
tems Co., 23 Wn. App. 622, 596 P.2d 1365 (1979).
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Finally, reducing the damage award by the amount attributable to inju-
ries caused by the plaintiff would eliminate the anomaly in recovery that
now exists. 36 Negligence and strict liability theories are often pleaded in
the alternative because of their overlapping elements.37 If comparative
causation is not merged with strict products liability, the result is "the
seemingly illogical position that the fault of the plaintiff will relieve the
defendant of liability when he is negligent, but not when he is inno-
cent. ''38
B. Deferring to the Legislature
The second major basis for the court's decision in Seay was that merg-
ing strict products liability with comparative causation was best left to the
legislature. The court noted that several legislative proposals which
would have extended comparative principles to strict liability were re-
jected. 39 Furthermore, the court observed that the legislature failed to ex-
tend the comparative negligence statute even after the court refused to
make that extension in Albrecht.40 From this, the court implied a legisla-
tive intent to reject merger.
Several other courts which merged comparative principles with strict
products liability faced a similar legislative problem. They held, how-
ever, that because strict products liability is a judicially created doctrine,
courts are free to alter it.41 These courts noted that while a comparative
negligence statute may expressly apply only to negligence actions (as
Washington's does) nothing in such a statute would forbid its application
to strict liability actions. 42 Thus, the common law doctrine of strict prod-
36. The anomaly is discussed in: Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 751
(D. Kan. 1978); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska
1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 738, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169-70, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380, 387-88 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 147
(1979). See also Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff s Conduct, 1968 UTAH L.
REV. 267, 284.
37. Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 752 (D. Kan. 1978). See also
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L. REV. 825, 841-50 (1973).
38. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 79 at 522 (4th ed. 1971).
39. 93 Wn. 2d at 323, 609 P.2d at 1384.
40. Id.
41. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 157 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166-67, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
384 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 146 n.3 (1979).
42. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 157 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 146 n.3 (1979). But see
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974).
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ucts liability could be modified without changing or controverting the ex-
isting statute. 43
The federal district court in Kansas refused to allot much significance
to legislative failure to amend the comparative negligence statute. The
district court noted that many provisions of the proposed bills contained
sections which changed more than the applicability of the comparative
system.44 The failure of the legislature to adopt a comprehensive products
liability bill need not prevent courts from acting in their traditional role as
fine-tuners of a common law principle for such as strict products liability.
This is especially true once a general legislative policy, such as compara-
tive negligence, is pronounced. 45 The Washington legislature is currently
considering a change in the comparative negligence system in Washing-
ton; however, it is contained in a comprehensive products liability and
tort reform bill46 to which objections have been made regarding sections
other than the comparative fault provisions. 47 The failure of a comprehen-
sive bill should not be interpreted by the courts as legislative disapproval
of the merger of strict products liability and comparative causation.
V. IMPLEMENTING COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
Now that the Washington Supreme Court has refused to apply compar-
ative causation to strict products liability actions, the legislature must
make the merger. The bill presently under consideration in the Washing-
ton legislature implements this merger in its "Effect of Contributory
Fault" section. 48 This section, by requiring a reduction of damages in
43. Some courts actually applied a "pure" comparative negligence system (straight percentage
reduction of award) even though the statute provided a "modified" system (no recovery if plaintiff's
negligence was greater than or as great as defendant's, or was gross and the defendant's slight). See
Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 162 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin Islands law) and V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451a (Supp. 1979); Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740,
757-58 (D. Kan. 1978) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Hop-
kins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977) and Tax. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
44. Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740,752 (D. Kan. 1978).
45. Id.; Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 158 n. Il (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin
Islands law).
46. State of Washington, S.B. 3158, 47th Sess. (1981). For previously considered but unpassed
Washington legislation, see S.B. 2744 and H.B. 1162, 45th Sess. (1977); S.B. 3073 and S.B. 2333,
46th Sess. (1979). But see S.B. 2296, 45th Sess. (1977) (proposing to change only the definition of
fault in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 to include strict liability).
47. Comments submitted by Seattle Consumers Action Network, Independent Business Ass'n,
Safeco Corp., and Washington State Trial Lawyers Association to the Select Senate Committee on
Torts and Products Liability Reform for its hearing, Oct. 10, 1980. (Copies of these communications
are on file at the Washington Law Review).
48. State of Washington, S.B. 3158 § 8, 47th Sess. (1981).
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proportion to the extent the injury is attributable to the claimant's actions,
is based on principles of causation.
A portion of the "Fault Defined" section, 49 however, states that the
trier of fact shall consider both the causal contribution of the conduct and
the nature of the conduct. This portion is flawed. In a strict liability ac-
tion, the nature, i.e., negligent character, of the defendant's conduct is
irrelevant. Beyond the initial determination of the fact of the plaintiff's
negligence, interjecting an evaluation of the degree of negligence of the
plaintiff's conduct to further reduce damages is unfair. Causal contribu-
tion alone should be compared.
As well as making strict liability part of the comparative process, the
bill includes unreasonable assumption of risk, 50 unforeseeable product
misuse, and unreasonable failure to avoid injury or mitigate damages in
the definition of faulty conduct subject to comparison. This approach fol-
lows that of the courts which have merged strict products liability and
comparative causation. 51 Making all types of negligent conduct by the
plaintiff damage-reducing, rather than recovery-defeating, is desirable.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the decision in Seay v. Chrysler Corp., Washington joined a mi-
nority of two states refusing to allow a plaintiff's negligence to reduce a
49. Id. at § 9.
50. In Washington, the type of assumption of risk that consists of voluntarily and unreasonably
encountering a known risk is already part of comparative negligence as damage-reducing behavior.
Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wn. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973). A question remains, however,
whether this sort of conduct by a plaintiff can truly be a part of the comparative process. If a plaintiff
has unreasonably and voluntarily encountered a known risk, perhaps he has broken the causal chain
completely, becoming the sole cause of his injuries. Despite theoretical problems, however, this
author believes that, generally, the merger of comparative causation and strict products liability pro-
duces more equitable results than the current state of Washington law.
51. Merging assumption of risk: Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 752
(D. Kan. 1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 735, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 385 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976); Busch v.
Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3. 597
P.2d 351, 354 (1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967).
Merging unforeseeable product misuse: Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 289
(5th Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi law); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555
P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977); Suter
v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,406 A.2d 140, 144 (1979); General Motors Corp.
v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977).
Two courts, however, have taken the position that the failure to discover a defect or guard against
the possibility of one should not be made part of the comparative process, although other sorts of
negligent conduct should. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976); Busch v.




strict products liability award. The majority concluded that changes in the
comparative system were best left to the legislature.
Presently, a bill is before the Washington legislature which would al-
low a merger of strict products liability and comparative principles. This
approach would produce more equitable results because each party would
bear the cost of its contribution to the injuries. This is particularly true if
the portion allowing a comparison of the nature of the conduct is omitted
beyond the initial determination of the plaintiffs negligence. The con-
suming public would not have to absorb the costs passed on by manufac-
turers that result from an individual consumer's negligence. Plaintiffs
also would no longer be totally barred from recovery if either assumption
of risk or unforeseeable product misuse is found. Swift passage of such a
comparative causation provision is urged. In the absence of legislative
action, an adoption of the merger by the court would achieve more equita-
ble results in strict products liability actions.
Shannon J. Skinner
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